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No unalloyed good
The AU’s rejection of “unconstitutional changes of 
government”
Theresa Reinold 
Democracy and Africa are two words that rarely appear in 
the same sentence. If they do, the sentences are usually 
framed in exhortatory or aspirational terms rather than as 
statements of facts. Yet even though free and fair elections 
are still far from being the habitual way of obtaining and 
transferring political power in Africa, the African Union (AU) 
has developed an impressive array of instruments that seek 
to nurture a culture of democratic competition in member-
states. The actual effects of these policies on democracy and 
the rule of law are rather ambivalent, however.
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In this post I want to make several arguments. I will show 
that (sub)regional organizations in Africa have actually 
displayed a rather consistent commitment to some elements 
of their democracy promotion framework, for instance the 
rejection of coup d’etats against sitting governments, and 
the practice of banning the perpetrators of unconstitutional 
changes of government from participating in subsequent 
elections. However, I shall also argue that the AU’s insistence 
on conformity with constitutional procedures sometimes 
frustrates efforts to advance popular sovereignty. Moreover, 
the AU’s democracy promotion efforts clearly display an 
incumbency bias. And finally, the common practice of 
brokering power-sharing agreements after contested 
elections neither strengthens the rule of law, nor does it 
contribute to fostering a culture of healthy democratic 
competition in Africa.
The concept of unconstitutional changes of government…
When in 2013 Egypt’s first democratically elected President, 
Mohamed Morsi, was toppled in a coup d’état after weeks of 
popular protests, the UN and many Western states reacted 
rather leniently. The AU, by contrast, swiftly suspended 
Egypt – one of its most powerful members – from 
participating in the activities of the Union, because the 
continental organization considered the coup to be an 
“unconstitutional change of government”. African efforts to 
give substance to the democratic entitlement include, inter 
alia, Art. 30 of the AU Constitutive Act, which declares that 
governments coming to power through unconstitutional 
means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of 
the continental organization, the adoption of the African 
Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, and, 
most notably, the 2003 amendment of the AU Constitutive 
Page 2 of 7No unalloyed good | Völkerrechtsblog
20.09.2017https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/no-unalloyed-good/
Act. This amendment expanded the scope of Art. 4(h), 
authorizing the AU to intervene in member-states in the 
event of a “serious threat to legitimate order” – militarily if 
necessary.
Unconstitutional changes of government are defined in the 
African Democracy Charter as follows:
• A military coup d’état against a democratically elected 
government
• Intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically 
elected government
• Replacement of a democratically elected government by armed 
rebel movements
• The refusal of an incumbent government to relinquish power 
after free and fair elections
• Amendment or revision of constitutions and legal instruments, 
contrary to the provisions of the constitution, to prolong the 
tenure of the incumbent government
Sanctions include the suspension of the member state’s 
participation in the activities of the AU as well as the 
imposition of targeted sanctions. Moreover, the perpetrators 
of unconstitutional changes of government are not allowed 
to participate in elections that are held after a coup to 
restore constitutional order and “may be tried before the 
competent court” (Art. 25 of the Democracy Charter). 
Another innovative feature is the AU’s right to intervene 
militarily in the event of a “serious threat to legitimate 
order”. According to the AU Constitutive Act no 
authorization from the UN Security Council is necessary, 
which clearly violates the prohibition on the use of force 
enshrined in Art. 2(4) of the UN Charter.
… and its application in practice: Good coups, bad coups
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Now that we have a rough idea of what the norms are on 
paper let us have a look at how they have been implemented 
in practice. In Mauritania and Madagascar, for instance, the 
AU responded to the overthrow of incumbent governments 
and quickly imposed sanctions, despite the poor governance 
records of these regimes and despite the popular support 
these coups enjoyed. These examples can be contrasted with 
the case of Zimbabwe, where one of Africa’s longest-serving 
dictators – Robert Mugabe – has consistently refused to give 
up power after elections, and yet the AU has remained 
extremely reluctant to enforce its norm against 
unconstitutional changes of government against the Mugabe 
regime.
The cases of Mauritania, Madagascar, Zimbabwe and also 
Egypt suggest that the AU has an incumbency bias, and even 
though there are a few counter-examples (Cote d’Ivoire is a 
case in point) this incumbency bias has undermined the 
legitimacy of the AU’s democracy promotion efforts. This 
raises another important point, namely that democracy and 
the rule of law do not always go hand in hand. The problem 
with the AU’s blanket prohibition on unconstitutional 
changes of government is that elections are not always free 
and fair in Africa, and that in the absence of a functioning 
system of democratic competition a coup d’etat is 
sometimes the only way of removing a repressive regime 
from power. While such a move is clearly in violation of the 
rule of law, it may sometimes be necessary to give effect to 
popular sovereignty. Hence it does make sense to 
distinguish between good coups and bad coups.
Quick fixes v long-term democracy promotion
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Finally, the AU and the subregional organizations’ practice of 
brokering power-sharing agreements after contested 
elections – Kenya is a case in point – is problematic both 
from a rule of law perspective and a democracy promotion 
perspective. These agreements often violate the rule of law – 
for instance by creating additional political offices such as a 
prime-minister post not foreseen in the constitution. 
Constitutions are thus manipulated to satisfy various 
political stakeholders in order to prevent or end post-
election violence. In the long run, this practice undermines 
the legitimacy of elections, the integrity of the constitution, 
and basically rewards the use of violence as a means of 
political competition.
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This post is part of our conference symposium “Rule of law 
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“Law and Politics in Asia, Africa, and Latin America”. The 
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The biggest innovation of Africa’s post-independence 
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managed to perpetuate their incumbency through 
constitutions.
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